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Abstract 
Calculating the cost of Turkish membership for the incumbent members is highly speculative. Not only 
Turkey, but also the EU are evolving and changing constantly. In addition, one cannot know with 
certainty what the rules concerning the budget will be by the time of accession. Hence one can only 
calculate the hypothetical cost under certain assumptions. This paper calculates first what Turkey would 
receive under the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds, if it were already a full member 
today. A second calculation shows what Turkey would receive by 2015 (a likely accession date) if 
current rules do not change. The main result is that the cost would in either case be rather small in 
relation to the EU economy (0.2% of EU GDP). EU transfers would have a significant impact in Turkey 
(amounting to around 4% of its GDP), but would still remain manageable for the EU budget. 
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Turkey and the European Budget 
Prospects and Issues 
EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 6/August 2004 
Kemal Derviş, Daniel Gros, Faik Öztrak and Yusuf Işık 
in cooperation with Fırat Bayar 
1. Introduction 
The factors that will determine the speed of convergence of Turkish incomes to EU averages are 
discussed in Working Paper No. 8 of this same series. We present here a brief discussion of the impact 
Turkish membership would have on the EU budget. How much would Turkish membership cost the 
then incumbent members? This is a question that is at the same time straightforward and impossible to 
answer. It is impossible in the sense that the EU is evolving constantly so that it is difficult to predict 
with any precision what the financial consequences of accession of Turkey, in, say, 2014, would be. 
However, it is straightforward to calculate how much Turkey would cost the EU budget if it were to 
enter under present rules. 
One may be tempted to argue that the transfers from the EU budget to Turkey will simply be whatever 
member countries agree that these transfers should be, because they do indeed under the current 
treaties all have to agree. On the other hand, it would not be possible to negotiate membership with 
any Turkish government if Turkey is not able to get a ‘fair’ deal, where ‘fairness’ will entail some 
comparison to other countries that will have joined relatively recently. The three countries on which 
Turkish negotiators are likely to focus are Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, assuming that the first two 
will have joined in 2007, and Croatia some time thereafter. Turkey will be able to accept transition 
rules of the type accepted by the 2004 accession countries as well as those already accepted by 
Romania and Bulgaria. And Turkey may even be ready to accept a lengthening of these transition 
rules reflecting recognition of her size. Turkey will not accept a deal, however, which would set it 
apart from other member states in a qualitative and lasting fashion. Nor is it actually likely that the EU 
would propose anything significantly less than fair to Turkey as the experience of Romania and 
Bulgaria suggests. The principle of equal treatment of member states is deeply ingrained in the EU’s 
framework – even when it comes to financial matters. 
A key factor limiting the degree of freedom of the EU budget is the fact that the financial envelopes 
are determined in a multi-annual framework called the ‘financial perspective’. The current framework, 
which was decided among the EU-15 in 2000, and thus long before the current enlargement, runs until 
2006. The next framework, which will be negotiated à 25, will run until 2012. By that time Turkey is 
not likely to have already become a member country so that it will have only a limited influence for 
the following financial framework, which would run until 2018, Assuming accession by 2015, this 
would imply that the financial envelope for the first three years of Turkey’s membership would have 
been decided by the EU-28 (the current EU-25 plus B, R and HR). In this respect, the situation of 
Turkey might thus resemble that of Bulgaria and Romania, which are likely to join by 2007, so that 
their first years of membership will also be covered by a financial framework in whose negotiations 
they were not present. 
In terms of negotiations, Turkey would thus be fully part of the EU’s financial framework only during 
the 2018-2024 round. Given that for all present and former member states it took between 5 and 10 
years before they were integrated into all support programmes, it is thus likely that Turkey will benefit 
fully from the EU’s budgetary support schemes some time after 2020. 
What will determine Turkey’s share in the EU budget of the 2020s, are the rules that will by then be in 
effect for everyone else and the level of development reached by the EU and Turkey itself. One cannot 2 | DERVİŞ, GROS, ÖZTRAK, IŞIK & BAYAR 
know with certainty what these rules will be and any long-term projections are therefore highly 
speculative. 
In reality, however, the discussion about the financial burden Turkey would represent for the EU 
budget usually focuses on the current rules. The experience with the current enlargement process 
suggests that over time the discussion will shift from how much it costs to who will bear the (minor) 
burden. But this point is still some way into the future. Current circumstances have another impact, 
however, in that it is usually assumed that the burden would have to be borne by the current EU-15 
because it is usually assumed that most of the new member countries will remain net beneficiaries for 
quite some time to come. By the early 2020s this might no longer be the case, but again it is 
impossible to forecast with any precision which of the new member countries would no longer qualify 
for financial support (under current rules) by that date. 
The ‘maximum’ that Turkey would receive after a transition period under current rules is a ‘starting 
point’ many analysts have chosen.
1 There are two variants to this approach.  
a)  How much would Turkey receive if it were a fully established member today? 
b)  How much is Turkey likely to receive under current rules by a likely accession date, e.g. 2015? 
The overall calculations are actually quite simple in both cases since the budget of the EU is 
dominated by two items: Structural Funds (destined for regions with a GDP per capita at PPP below 
75% of the EU average) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The gross receipts of any 
member country are to a large extent determined by these two items.  
2.  Turkey in the EU today 
If Turkey were a member country today, it could count on Structural Funds allocations, which would 
be capped at 4% of its GDP as decided at the Berlin European Council. Given that Turkey’s GDP has 
averaged around €200 billion in recent years, this implies immediately that its allocation would be 
around €8 billion annually. 
It has also been calculated that extending the current CAP to Turkey (with per hectare payments based 
on current yields) would cost around €9 billion. This implies that the total receipts of a hypothetical 
Turkish EU member today might be slightly less than €20 billion (Turkey would also receive funding 
under other programmes). Turkey would then also have to contribute as all other member states to the 
EU budget. With a current contribution rate of around 1% of GNP (the ceiling for the EU budget is 
1.25% of GDP, but the EU spends just slightly above 1% of GDP at present), this would mean around 
€2 billion annually, leading to a net financial benefit of around €16 billion annually. Apart from the 
fact that this approach is based on today’s conditions, the sum mentioned also represents an upper 
bound. 
3.  Turkey in 2015 in an enlarged EU 
In calculating the sums Turkey would receive in 2015, it does not make sense to use current euros 
since both the EU and the Turkish economy are likely to grow over the next decade. 
Once again, the starting point for the Structural Funds is that the absorption limit has been set at 4% of 
the recipient’s GDP. This implies that one can immediately calculate the ceiling of what Turkey could 
receive under current rules for the Structural Funds, once one has an idea of the size of the Turkish 
GDP.  
Under the growth scenario presented in section 2 above, Turkey will grow much more quickly than the 
EU over the next decade and Turkish GDP could reach about 4% of that of the EU-28 GDP (at present 
it amounts to only around 2%) by the middle of the next decade. This implies immediately that the 
                                                 
1 See Hughes (2004) as well as Quaisser & Reppegather (2004). TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN BUDGET | 3 
cost of extending current Structural Funds to Turkey would cost at most 0.16% of EU-28 GDP 
(=0.04*0.04).  
The calculations for agriculture are potentially more complicated since one would have to guess the 
output structure of agriculture in Turkey in about a decade and then calculate to what extent this would 
change if Turkey participates in the CAP. This would actually be an exceedingly complex operation as 
one would have to take into account the entire input/output matrix. For example, some commodities 
(maize) are used an input in the production of others (meat). However, this is not necessary as an 
indirect approach can yield a better result.  
The starting point is that Turkish farmers are likely to obtain at most 20% of their value added from 
the EU’s CAP, for the simple reason that this is what farmers in the EU-15 obtain today: the CAP 
costs at present amount to 0.5% of GDP and the value added produced by agriculture is about 2.5% of 
the EU-15 GDP.  
Agriculture produces at present around 12% of GDP in Turkey, but taking into account that its share 
has been declining continuously over the last decade, a reasonable assumption might be that in about a 
decade agriculture will account for about 10% of Turkish GDP at the maximum. On this basis one can 
easily calculate the potential maximum cost of extending the present rate of support of the CAP to 
Turkey. Assuming, as before, that the Turkish economy accounts for 4% of EU GDP (and that 
agriculture contributes 10% to this), the cost of providing an ‘equivalent rate of support’ for Turkish 
agriculture would be 0.08% of EU-15 GDP (=0.2*0.04=02.*0.04*0.1). To repeat, this is again an 
upper bound. Other estimates arrive at much lower numbers; see for example Quaisser and 
Reppegather (2004) who argue that the cost of extending the CAP to Turkey should only be around 
0.045% of the EU’s GDP. 
The number calculated above is again an upper limit, as the CAP is likely to change over time, inter 
alia, because of the commitments made by the EU in the context of the WTO to abolish exports 
subsidies, and the general limitations the WTO imposes on various types of domestic agricultural 
subsidies in general. Moreover, it has already been agreed within the EU that the cost of the CAP 
should rise by less than 80% of the increase in nominal GDP. This implies that the cost of the CAP as 
a percentage of EU GDP has to fall over the next decade.
2 Depending on the overall growth rate of the 
EU, the cost of the CAP is thus likely to be less than 0.4% of the GDP of the enlarged EU once Turkey 
joins. Since any single country, even if it is the largest one, is not likely to get more than one-fourth of 
this sum, it is clear that the cost of extending tomorrow’s CAP to Turkey cannot be more than 0.05 to 
0.1% of the EU’s GDP. 
The gross cost (Structural Funds plus CAP) together might thus amount to 0.26% of EU-28 GDP 
(=0.096+0.16). Against the gross receipts, one would have to set the contribution that Turkey would 
have to make to the EU budget. At present, and this is unlikely to change any time soon, all member 
states contribute at the same rate, or rather % of GNP, to the EU budget. The contribution rate is equal 
to the share of the EU budget in overall GDP. Assuming that the EU budget will continue to be limited 
to around 1-1.2% of GDP, this implies that Turkey will have to contribute about 1.2% of its own GDP 
to the EU budget. Under the assumptions made so far (Turkish GDP at about 4% of that of the EU-
15), this would then amount to around 0.048% of EU-15. 
The ceiling for the net cost should thus be around 0.20% of EU GDP (equivalent to about €20 billion 
given today’s EU GDP of around €10.000 billion) under both illustrative calculations.  
                                                 
2 For example, with a growth rate of nominal GDP of 5% p.a., this rule would imply that the budget available for 
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Table 1. Maximum budgetary cost, full membership 
  Turkey in today’s EU 
(in billions of current euros) 
Turkey 2015 in enlarged EU 
(as a % of EU GDP) 
Structural Funds  8  0.16 
CAP receipts  9  0.08 
Total receipts  16  0.25 
Contributions to EU budget  2  0.05 
(Max) Net receipts for Turkey  16 (0.16% of EU GDP)  0.20 
Source: Own calculations based on current EU budgetary rules and regulations. 
4. Transitional  arrangements 
The numbers calculated above represent the maximum that would be achieved only after a 
considerable transition period, as in the case of the new member countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe, assuming current rules. The immediate post-membership transfers would be much lower, as 
in the case of all new member countries. As argued above, the experience of Romania and Bulgaria 
might be particularly instructive in this respect given that these two countries have a similar GDP per 
capita and it could thus be said that they set the benchmark for Turkey. Neither Romania, nor Bulgaria 
will participate in the current negotiations for the next financial framework, but the EU has already 
proposed a certain allocation for them (and the two countries have not objected), amounting to a total 
of around €15 billion at current prices. Since the combined population of these two countries is about 
30 million, Turkey should receive about 2.3 times as much if it were to be treated equally on a per 
capita basis. This would then amount to about €35 billion over three years. All this suggests that for 
the first years of membership, transfers in the range €9-12 billion per annum might be realistic. 
The new member states from Central and Eastern Europe benefited also from modest amounts of pre-
accession aid, originally under a programme, PHARE, whose primary justification was to support the 
transition to a market economy, not preparation for accession. The PHARE funds (mostly for technical 
assistance for democracy building, etc.) were later augmented by two additional programmes: 
SAPARD (support to structural change in agriculture) and ISPA (infrastructure). Over the last years 
(2000-03) the total support going to, for example Bulgaria has been around €300 million per annum, 
with about half coming from PHARE, one-third under ISPA and the remainder under SAPARD. The 
original justification for PHARE funding does not apply in the case of Turkey; but it is clear that a 
substantial amount of funding for democracy-building will appear needed viewed from the EU side.  
Since the equality of treatment is so much engrained in the EU approach, it is thus likely that as 
negotiations proceed a similar amount of financial support for the preparation for accession will 
become available for Turkey as well. Scaling the funds available for Bulgaria – either on a per capita 
or on a % of GDP basis – yields a similar result in that the total available for Turkey might be just a bit 
below €3 billion per annum (not immediately, but after 4-5 years). This would correspond to 
approximately 1-1.2% of GDP for Turkey (0.03% of the EU’s GDP or 2-2.5% of its budget). 
5. Concluding  remarks 
Are figures in the range of 0.15% to at most 0.20% of EU GDP large or small numbers? Compared to 
national government expenditure, which is usually around 40-50% of GDP, they are negligible. 
However, a figure of, say, 0.17% of EU GDP would not be negligible compared to the EU-budget 
ceiling of 1.25% of GDP. The current discussion whether the EU budget should be limited to 1 or 
1.25% of GDP shows that sometimes even small sums can have a considerable political impact. It 
must be stressed, however, that all the numbers referred to here are highly tentative. The rules 
themselves are likely to become more restrictive for both Structural Funds and agriculture as the 
current discussions on reform of the CAP and Structural Funds show. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN BUDGET | 5 
 
Nevertheless, the projections made here appear realistic in terms of what is economically and 
politically likely to be feasible. Net transfers in the €9-12 billion range in the first post-membership 
years and of about €15 to €20 billion in the 2020s would constitute an important amount for Turkey, a 
significant but manageable amount for the EU budget and be negligible compared to the sum of 
national budgets or the overall EU economy.  
The budgetary side of membership negotiations is usually left to the very end because this is the only 
area with a zero sum game. What Turkey gains, others must pay. In the end, however, the numbers tell 
only part of the story. The nature of the financial package will depend to a large measure on how the 
EU has developed in the meantime. For a self-confident enlarged EU that has successfully absorbed 
more than a dozen member countries during the first decade of the 21st century, the challenge of 
integrating Turkey into its rules of financial support to its weaker member states will be manageable, 
particularly if some of the recent member countries have in the meantime graduated from the need for 
large-scale financial support. Sustained rapid growth in Turkey would be another key factor as it 
would dispel the fear that Turkey would be a drain on the EU budget for a long time to come and 
reflect the rise of Turkey’s contribution capacity. 
 
Bibliography 
Chislett, W. (2004), Turkey’s Membership of the European Union: A Rose or a Thorn, Working Paper No. 
17/2004, Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid. 
European Commission (2002), “Information note on the main findings of a report on Macroeconomic and 
Financial Sector Stability Developments in Candidate Countries”. 
European Commission (2003), “Continuing Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report of the European 
Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey”, Brussels (available 
at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm#comprehensive). 
European Commission (2003), EPC, “Key structural challenges in the acceding countries: The integration of the 
acceding countries into the Community’s economic policy coordination processes”, Occasional Paper No. 
4, July. 
European Commission (2003), EPC, Occasional Paper No. 4, July. 
European Commission (2003), “Progress towards meeting economic criteria for accession: The assessment from 
the 2003 comprehensive monitoring reports and regular report”, Enlargement Paper No. 19, November. 
European Commission (2003), “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. 
European Commission (2003), “Projected trends in candidate countries’ debt ratios in the light of the 2003 fiscal 
notifications”, Enlargement Paper No. 16, September. 
EUROSTAT (2003), “Statistical Yearbook on Candidate Countries” (available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat). 
Gros, Daniel (2004), “Financial aspects of central bank independence and prıce stabılıty: The case of Turkey”, 
CEPS/LUISS Working Document. 
Hughes, Kirsty (2004), Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement, A Friends of Europe 
Working Paper. 
Lejour, A.M., R.A. de Mooij and C.H. Capel (2004), Assessing the Economic Implications of Turkish Accession 
to the EU, CPB Document No. 56, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, 
March. 
Lejour, A.M., R.A. de Mooij and R. Nahuis (2004), “EU Enlargement: Economic Implications for Countries and 
Industries”, in H. Berger, T. Moutos and H-W. Sinn (eds), Managing EU Enlargement, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, forthcoming. 
Quaisser, W. and A. Reppegather (2004), EU-Beitrittsreife der Turkei und Konsequenzen einer EU-
Mitgliedschaft, Working Paper No. 252, Osteuropa-Institut, Munich. C  E 
P  S 
 
CENTRE FOR 
EUROPEAN 
POLICY 
STUDIES 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 
www.ceps.be ▪ info@ceps.be 
 
W
e
b
s
i
t
e
:
 
w
w
w
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
 
B
o
o
k
s
h
o
p
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
s
h
o
p
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
About CEPS 
 
 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 